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Abstract—This work proposes a moving target defense (MTD)
strategy to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs)
against power grids. A CCPA consists of a physical attack, such
as disconnecting a transmission line, followed by a coordinated
cyber attack that injects false data into the sensor measurements
to mask the effects of the physical attack. Such attacks can lead
to undetectable line outages and cause significant damage to the
grid. The main idea of the proposed approach is to invalidate
the knowledge that the attackers use to mask the effects of the
physical attack by actively perturbing the grid’s transmission
line reactances using distributed flexible AC transmission system
(D-FACTS) devices. We identify the MTD design criteria in this
context to thwart CCPAs. The proposed MTD design consists
of two parts. First, we identify the subset of links for D-FACTS
device deployment that enables the defender to detect CCPAs
against any link in the system. Then, in order to minimize
the defense cost during the system’s operational time, we use
a game-theoretic approach to identify the best subset of links
(within the D-FACTS deployment set) to perturb which will
provide adequate protection. Extensive simulations performed
using the MATPOWER simulator on IEEE bus systems verify the
effectiveness of our approach in detecting CCPAs and reducing
the operator’s defense cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber threats against power grids are of increasing concern
due to the deep integration of information and communication
technologies (ICT) into grid operation. A recent real-world
example was the December 2015 cyber attack against the
Ukraine’s power grid which resulted in large-scale outages that
lasted several hours [1]. The attack was carried out by opening
several transmission line circuit breakers and simultaneously
blocking the information lines (e.g., telephone lines) to cover
up the attacks. Such attacks have alerted us to a general class of
attacks called the coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs).
As the name suggests, a CCPA consists of two components,
namely, a physical attack and a cyber attack. The physical
attack involves disconnecting a transmission line, generator
or transformer. On the other hand, a cyber attack involves
manipulating the sensor measurements that are conveyed from
the field devices to the control center, and has an effect
of masking the physical attack. The attacker may readily
launch such a cyber attack by exploiting the power grid’s
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communication vulnerabilities [2]. CCPAs can have severe
effects on the grid, since undetected line/generator outages
may trigger cascading failures, and have received significant
recent attention [3], [4], [5], [6].
To defend against CCPAs, recent studies [4] and [6] have
proposed strategies based on securing a set of measurements
(e.g., by encryption) or relying on measurements from known-
secure phasor measurement units (PMU) deployed in the grid.
However, power grids consist of many legacy devices whose
life cycles can last several decades, and incorporating major
security upgrades in these devices can be quite expensive.
Moreover, extensive research has shown that PMUs themselves
are vulnerable to false data injection (FDI) attacks, which can
be launched by spoofing their GPS receivers [7].
In this work, we propose a novel defense strategy to detect
CCPAs based on the technique of moving target defense
(MTD). As in prior works [3], [4], [5], [6], we only consider
physical attacks that disconnect the transmission lines. We note
that to craft an undetectable CCPA, the attacker must obtain
an accurate knowledge of certain line reactances [4], [6]. The
main idea of the proposed MTD defense in this context is to
invalidate the attacker’s prior acquired knowledge by actively
perturbing of the grid’s line reactance settings. This can be ac-
complished using distributed flexible AC transmission system
(D-FACTS) devices, which are capable of performing active
impedance injection and are being increasingly deployed in
power grids [8]. The proposed MTD defense strategy has the
potential to make it extremely difficult for the attacker to track
the system’s dynamics and gather sufficient information to
craft undetectable CCPA. The main contributions of this work
are as follows:
• First, we formulate the MTD design problem to defend
against CCPAs and identify the MTD design criteria in
this context.
• We then propose a solution to the D-FACTS deployment
problem using a graph-theoretic approach. Our proposed
solution identifies the minimum-sized subset of links for
D-FACTS deployment which enables the defender to
detect CCPAs against any transmission line.
• However, an MTD solution that involves perturbing a
large number the branch reactances can be expensive
due to the MTD’s operational cost [9]. To reduce the
operator’s cost of defense, during the system’s operational
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time, we use a game-theoretic formulation to identify the
best subset of links to perturb that will provide adequate
protection.
Extensive simulations conducted using the MATPOWER sim-
ulator shows the effectiveness of our solution. Moreover, the
results show that the game-theoretic approach significantly
reduces the operator’s defense cost.
II. PRIOR WORK
Power grid security has received significant interest in the
past few years. In particular, FDI attacks against power grid
state estimation have been extensively studied [10], [11], [12].
While FDI attacks affect only the sensor measurements that
are conveyed to the control center (and hence consist only of
a cyber attack), recent research [3], [4], [5], [6] has studied
CCPAs attacks, which as noted above consist of both cyber
and physical components. CCPAs were first proposed in [3]
based on disconnecting a set of transmission lines and blocking
sensor measurements from the attacked area. However, the
proposed cyber attack cannot completely mask the effects
of the physical attack. Moreover, under some conditions, it
was shown that the operator can recover the phase angles
and detect the physical attack using information from outside
the attacked zone [3]. On the other hand, [4], [5] and [6]
proposed the design of cyber attacks that can completely mask
the effects of the physical attack under different assumptions
about the attacker’s knowledge. Further, [4], [5] and [6] have
also investigated defense against CCPAs relying on a subset
of protected measurements, which however is vulnerable (see
Section I).
Recently, the concept of MTD has been applied to defend
against FDI attacks [13], [14], [9], [15]. In comparison to
these works, we are the first to apply MTD for defense against
CCPAs. Our analysis shows that MTD for defending against
CCPAs requires the formulation of novel design criteria both
in terms of D-FACTS placement as well as D-FACTS per-
turbation selection in comparison to aforementioned works.
Finally, we note that while game theory has been used in the
context of defense against FDI attacks [16], [17], this work is
the first to apply it in the context of MTD design in power
grids.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Power Grid Model: We consider a power grid consisting
of N buses and L transmission lines. The set of buses and
transmission lines are denoted by N = {1, . . . , N} and
L = {1, . . . , L} respectively. An example of the IEEE-4
bus system with 5 links is shown in Fig. 1. At bus i, we
denote the amount of generation and load by Gi and Li
respectively. We let l = {i, j} denote a transmission line
l ∈ L that connects bus i and bus j and its reactance by
xl. The power flowing on the corresponding line l is denoted
by Fl, which under the DC power flow model [18] is given
by Fl = 1xl (θi − θj), where θi and θj are the voltage phase
angles at buses i, j ∈ N respectively. In vector form, the power
flow vector f = [F1, . . . , FL]T is related to the voltage phase
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Fig. 1: An example of a 4 bus power grid.
angle vector θ = [θ1, . . . , θN ] as f = DATθ, where the
matrix A ∈ RN×L is the branch-bus incidence matrix [18]
and D ∈ RL×L is a diagonal matrix of the reciprocals of link
reactances. We denote the set of links on which D-FACTS
devices are deployed by LD where LD ⊆ L. D-FACTS
devices enable the reactances of these lines to be varied within
a pre-defined range [xmin,xmax], where xmin,xmax are the
reactance limits achievable by the D-FACTS devices.
Optimal Power Flow: For any given load condition l =
[L1, . . . , LN ], the system operator sets the generation dispatch
and line reactance settings by solving the optimal power flow
(OPF) problem, stated as follows:
COPF = min
g,x
∑
i∈N
Ci(Gi) (1a)
s.t. g − l = Bθ, (1b)
f ∈ F ,g ∈ G,x ∈ X , (1c)
where Ci(·) is the generation cost at bus i ∈ N . Equa-
tion (1a) is the nodal power balance constraint, where the
matrix B = ADAT . Constraints (1c) correspond to the
branch power flows, generator limits, and D-FACTS limits,
respectively, where F = [−fmax, fmax],G = [gmin,gmax] and
X = [xmin,xmax] and fmax is the maximum permissible line
power flow (i.e., the thermal limit) and gmin,gmax are the
generator limits. We note that in the absence of D-FACTS,
OPF optimizes over the generator dispatch values only.
State Estimation & Bad Data Detection: The system state,
i.e., the voltage phase angles θ, are estimated from the
noisy sensor measurements using the state estimation (SE)
technique. The sensor measurements, which we denote by z ∈
RM , correspond to the nodal power injections, and the forward
and reverse branch power flows, i.e. z = [p˜, f˜ ,−f˜ ]T and M is
the total number of measurements, where M = N + 2L. We
denote the sensor measurement noises by a vector n ∈ RM ,
which is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution. Under the
DC power flow model, the relationship between θ and z is
given by z = Hθ + n, where H ∈ RM×N is the system’s
measurement matrix given by H = [DAT ;−DAT ;ADAT ]
([A;B] denotes the row concatenation of matrices A and B).
The maximum likelihood (ML) technique is used for system
state estimation [18]. Under ML estimation, the estimate θ̂ is
related to the measurements z as θ̂ = (HTWH)−1HTWz,
where W is a diagonal weighting matrix whose elements are
reciprocals of the variances of the sensor measurement noise
components.
After state estimation, a bad data detector (BDD) computes
a quantity referred to as the residual, which we denote by r
as r = ||z−Hθ̂||. A bad data alarm is flagged if the residual
exceeds a predefined threshold τ. The threshold is adjusted
to ensure that the false positive (FP) rate does not exceed α,
where α > 0 (usually a small value close to zero).
Undetectable False Data Injection Attacks: We denote the
FDI attack vector by a ∈ RM , which the attacker injects into
the sensor measurements and the measurement vector with the
FDI attack by za, given by za = z + a. It has been shown
[10] that an FDI attack of the form a = Hc, where c ∈ RN ,
remains undetected by the BDD. Specifically, the probability
of detection for such attacks is equal to the FP rate α. We call
these attacks undetectable FDI attacks.
Coordinated Cyber and Physical Attack: While an FDI
attack only modifies the sensor measurements, a CCPA attacks
the grid physically followed by a coordinated FDI attack on
the sensor measurements, as noted above. In particular, we
consider physical attacks that disconnect a set of transmission
lines, e.g., by opening the line circuit breakers. The physical
attack will alter the power grid’s topology and power flow, and
the mismatch between the pre-attack (i.e., line disconnections)
and post-attack measurements can generally be detected by the
BDD. However, it has been shown that if the attacker injects
a carefully-constructed coordinated FDI attack on the sensor
measurements, then the effect of the physical attack on the
BDD residual can be completely masked [6]. Hence, the attack
remains undetected by the BDD.
Denote the set of links disconnected by the attacker under
a physical attack by LA. We use the subscript “p” to denote
the power grid parameters following the physical attack. It can
be shown that the grid measurements post the physical attack
are related to the pre-attack measurements by zp = z + ap,
where ap = H∆θ + ∆Hθp, where ∆H is the change in the
measurement matrix before and after the physical attack, given
by, ∆H = H − Hp. Reference [6] showed that in order to
mask the effect of the physical attack and remain undetected
by the BDD, the attacker must inject a coordinated FDI attack
of the form a = ∆Hθp.
Knowledge Required to Launch a CCPA: Next, we enlist
the knowledge required by the attacker to construct an FDI
attack of the form a = ∆Hθp. Assume that the attacker
disconnects a single branch LA = {l} that connects buses
i and j. It can be easily verified that ∆H depends on the
tripped branch reactance xl only. Therefore, to construct the
attack a = ∆Hθp, the attacker must obtain knowledge of the
branch reactance xl and the difference in phase angles of the
buses i and j following the physical attack, i.e., θi,p−θj,p [6].
The knowledge of θi,p − θj,p can be obtained by monitoring
the line power flows following the physical attack as follows:
θi,p − θj,p = −
∑
m∈pkl
xlmFlm,p, (2)
where pkl is any alternative path between nodes i and j in
the residual power network following the physical disconnec-
tions, i.e., L \ LA. Each path pkl in turn is a collection of
links pkl = {lk1 , lk2 , . . . , lkM } such that src(lk1) = i and
dst(lkM ) = j, and kM is the number of links in the path
pkl . We denote by Pl = {p1l , p2l , . . . , pKll } a collection of
all alternative paths between buses i and j, where Kl is the
number of such alternative paths. Note that the subscript l
denotes the disconnected link.
In the IEEE-4 bus example, assume that the attcker dis-
connects link 1. After the disconnection, there are two alter-
native paths between buses 1 and 4, and hence, K1 = 2.
These paths are given by p1l = {2, 3, 4} with k1 = 3 and
p2l = {5, 4} with k2 = 2. The attacker can compute the
phase angle difference between nodes 1 and 2 using (2) as
θ1,p− θj2p = − (x2F2,p + x3F3,p + x4F4,p) or, θ1,p− θj2p =
− (x5F5,p + x4F4,p) .
In (2), the attacker can obtain the knowledge of power flows
Flm,p by monitoring the line flow sensor measurements. On
the other hand, the line reactances xlm can be learned by
monitoring the grid power flows over a period of time using
existing techniques [19], [20]. The attacker can also learn the
reactance of the disconnected branch xl similarly.
IV. MOVING-TARGET DEFENSE FOR CCPAS
In this work, we propose a solution to defend the system
against CCPAs based on the MTD technique. The main idea
behind this approach is to periodically perturb the branch
reactances of certain transmission lines to invalidate the at-
tacker’s acquired knowledge. Hence, an attack constructed
using outdated knowledge of the system can be detected by
the BDD. (The reader can refer to [20] for practical guidance
on how frequently the branch reactances must be perturbed.)
In this section, we first formalize the MTD design problem
to defend against CCPAs. The solution to the MTD design
problem is presented in Section V. The details are presented
next.
Recall from (2) that to construct an undetectable CCPA,
the attacker must acquire the following: (i) knowledge of the
reactance of the tripped branch, xl, and (ii) knowledge of
branch reactances in at-least one alternate paths pkl between
the nodes i and j. Therefore, under MTD, the defender can
thwart the CCPA by invalidating one of the two:
C1. Invalidate the attacker’s knowledge of the tripped
branch’s reactance xl.
C2. Invalidate the attacker’s knowledge of at-least one of the
branches in the path pkl between nodes i and j.
Note that the defender however cannot have prior knowledge
of which link the attacker chooses to disconnect. Moreover,
for a disconnected link l, the defender has no way of knowing
which path pkl ∈ Pl the attacker may have used to compute the
phase angle difference θi,p−θj,p as in (2). Thus, the defender
must invalidate the attacker’s knowledge of the reactance of
at-least one branch in every path pkl ∈ Pl. The defender must
do so for every link l ∈ L (such that the attacker cannot launch
a CCPA by disconnecting any link in the grid). Based on the
arguments above, the MTD perturbation selection problem can
be stated as follows:
Problem 1 (MTD problem). For each branch l ∈ L, invalidate
the knowledge of at-least one of the branches in {l}∪pkl , k =
1, . . . ,Kl.
The MTD perturbation problem poses constraints on the D-
FACTS deployment set LD, since a preliminary requirement
to invalidate the attacker’s knowledge of a branch reactance
is the presence of a D-FACTS device on that link. Thus,
LD must be chosen in a way that it gives the defender the
ability to protect every link l ∈ L. A trivial solution is to
deploy a D-FACTS device on every link of the power grid.
However, a system operator may wish to minimize the number
of D-FACTS devices installed in order to minimize the device
deployment cost.
On the other hand, MTD perturbations incur an opeartional
cost for the defender. Reference [9] characterized this cost in
terms of the increase in OPF cost of the grid due to the MTD
perturbations1. Perturbing the reactances of a large number
of links may be expensive. Thus, at the system’s operational
time, the defender may wish to perturb the reactances of only
a subset of links, which we denote by LDw , where LDw ⊆
LD, such that the attacker cannot launch CCPAs against some
specific links that are perceived to be important and vulnerable
to attack.
In what follows, we provide solutions to both the afore-
mentioned aspects of MTD design problem. Specifically, we
first present an algorithm to find the D-FACTS deployment set
LD that satisfies the MTD design problem with a minimum
number of devices based on a graph-theoretic approach. Sub-
sequently, we present a solution to the problem of selecting
a subset of links LDw for reactance perturbation at the
operational time based on a game-theoretic approach.
V. SOLUTION TO THE MTD DESIGN PROBLEM
In this section, we solve the MTD design problem formal-
ized in Section IV. We first address the problem of finding the
D-FACTS deployment set.
A. D-FACTS Deployment
Our key observation to solve the D-FACTS deployment set
problem is that each set of links {l}∪pkl , k = 1, . . . , kM , forms
a loop in the graph G. For example, in the 4-bus example
in Figure 1, assuming that the attacker disconnects link 1,
the links {1} ∪ {2, 3, 4} and {1} ∪ {4, 5} form loops in the
corresponding graph. If a DFACTS device is installed on a
subset of links in the graph such that every loop in the network
has at least one link with a D-FACTS device installed, then
the attacker cannot launch an undetectable CCPA.
In graph-theoretic terms, the problem is equivalent to re-
moving a subset of links in the network such that the residual
graph has no loops. For optimized deployment, LD must be
the minimum number of such links. If each link is assigned a
weight of 1, then LD must be a subset of links with minimum
weight.
1Note that in the absence of MTD, the D-FACTS settings are adjusted to
minimize the OPF cost as in (1a). Thus, the MTD perturbations will increase
the OPF cost, and the MTD operational cost in non-negative.
The set LD can be found by solving the minimum weight
feedback edge set problem in an undirected graph [21]. The so-
lution proceeds by finding the maximum weight spanning tree
(MWST). Specifically, let Lsptr be the MWST of the graph G.
If D-FACTS devices are installed on the links L\Lsptr, then the
attacker cannot find a loop within the graph whose branches
do not have a D-FACTS device installed. Equivalently, the
attacker cannot launch an undetectable CCPA. Further, since
the links in Lsptr form a maximum-weighted spanning tree,
L \ Lsptr are the links with minimum weight which can be
disconnected. Equivalently, the links L\Lsptr are the minimum
number of links that satisfy the D-FACTS desgin problem
described in Section IV. Thus, the D-FACTS deployment set
LD = L \ Lsptr.
Consider the D-FACTS deployment set LD chosen accord-
ing to the above arguments. Assume that the defender perturbs
the reactances of the set of links LDw ⊆ LD. Then, we have
the following:
• A physical attack against a link l can be detected by the
BDD if the links in LDw ensure that the conditions listed
in Problem 1 are satisfied for that link. We will henceforth
refer to such a link to being “protected” under the MTD
link perturbation set LDw .
• Naturally, based on the arguments stated in this section,
if LDw = LD, then all the links l ∈ L are protected from
the physical attacks.
B. MTD Perturbation Selection Using Game Theory
MTD perturbations incur an operational cost, and perturbing
the reactances of a large set of links may not be cost effective.
In this section, we answer the question of how to select the
appropriate perturbation set LDw . The main idea is to protect
only a subset of links from physical attacks depending on
the operational state of the system, as well as the perceived
threat to those links. This is approached using a game-theoretic
formulation. The details are presented next.
1) Game Formulation: We define the strategic interactions
between the attacker and the defender as a two-player non-
cooperative game. To formalize this, we define the game as a
triplet G , ({D,A}, {SD,SA}, {uD, uA}) in which the com-
ponents are: (i) the set of players {D,A}; (ii) SD and SA, the
sets of actions that defender and attacker can take respectively;
and (iii) the payoffs of the players uk : SD × SA → R for
k ∈ {D,A}, where uk(sD, sA) measures the benefit obtained
by player k when the action profile that has been played is
s = (sD, sA).
We denote the attacker’s and the defender’s action sets by
SA = {a0, a1, . . . , aNA−1} and SD = {d0, d1, . . . , dND−1}
respectively, where NA and ND are the cardinality of the sets
SA and SD respectively. The attacker’s action set is the subset
of links it disconnects physically. We denote the set of links
disconnected by the attacker under action ai by Lai , where,
Lai ⊆ L, i = 0, 1, . . . , NA − 1. The action a0 corresponds
to the case when the attacker does not attack any link. The
defender’s action is to select a subset of links within LD whose
reactances will be perturbed. We denote the set of links chosen
by the defender under action di by Ldi , where, Ldi ⊆ LD, i =
1, . . . , ND − 1. The action d0 corresponds to the case when
the defender does not perturb the reactance of any link.
Next, we characterize the attacker’s and the defener’s pay-
offs. The cost of damage due to the attack can be characterized
as follows. If the attacker disconnects a link l that is protected
by the defender (due to the MTD perturbations), then the
CCPA will be detected by the BDD, and the system operator
can quickly restore the link to ensure that the attack does
not result in any further damage. For instance, the defender
can quickly restore the circuit breaker of the disconnected
link to a closed position. On the other hand, if the attacker
disconnects a link that is not protected by the defender, then
the CCPA will go undetected. The link disconnection will
result in redistribution of power flows. Consequently, all the
links on which the power flows exceeds the corresponding
thermal limits will experience physical damage, and will get
disconnected from the grid. In this case, the system operator
will have to initiate load shedding in order to ensure that the
attack does not result in further damage. (Herein, we assume
that the BDD will detect the attack once additional links are
disconnected, since the attacker’s data injection will only mask
the effect of disconnection of the first link.) We denote the cost
of load shedding at bus i by Ci,s(Lsi ), where L
s
i (≤ Li) is the
quantity of load that is shed. We denote ls = [Ls1, . . . , L
s
N ].
Let COPF(am, dn) denote the OPF cost when the attacker
takes an action am and the defender takes an action dn. It can
be computed as follows:
COPF(am, dn) = min
g,ls
∑
i∈N
Ci,g(Gi) + Ci,s(L
s
i ) (3)
s.t. g − l+ ls = Bam,dnθ,
f ∈ F ,g ∈ G,
where Bam,dn is given by Bam,dn = Aam,dnDam,dnA
T
am,dn
.
Here, Aam,dn is the bus-branch connectivity matrix when
the attacker and the defender choose actions am and dn
respectively. These quantities are computed as in Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: Cost Computation
Data: am, dn
Result: COPF(am, dn)
1 Set branch reactances to xdn .
2 Set Aam,dn = Aa0,d0 .
3 Solve (3) to obtain COPF(a0, dn).
4 if attack is successful then
5 Recompute power flows after removing the branches in
Lam .
6 Monitor the branches for which the power flow exceeds the
line capacity. Denote such links by Lcam .
7 Set Aam,dn , Dam,dn by removing the branches Lam and
Lcam . Solve (3) to compute COPF(am, dn).
8 else
9 Set COPF(am, dn) = COPF(a0, dn).
10 end
Based on the formulation above, the defender’s payoff is
given by
uD(sD, sA) =
{
COPF(d0, a0)− COPF(sD, a0), if IS = 0
COPF(d0, a0)− COPF(sD, sA), if IS = 1,
and the attacker’s payoff is
uA(sD, sA) =
{
0, if IS = 0
COPF(sD, sA)− COPF(d0, a0), if IS = 1,
where IS is an indicator variable to represent the success
(IS = 1) or failure of an attack (IS = 0). Both players
aim to choose their actions such that their own payoff is
maximized and although the game is not a zero-sum game, we
can see that the two players have contradictory objectives. The
above payoffs can be explained as follows. First, COPF(d0, a0)
denotes the benchmark operating cost of the defender when
none of the players takes an action to either disrupt or defend
the system. The term COPF(sD, sA) − COPF(d0, a0) denotes
the the additional cost incurred by the defender and caused
by a successful attack, when the attacker chooses sA and the
defender chooses sD; the defender’s aim is to minimize this
cost whereas the attacker wants to maximize it. The term
COPF(sD, a0) − COPF(d0, a0) represents the additional cost
incurred by the defender for choosing an action sD against
an unsuccessful attack sA; the defender will seek to minimize
this cost while neutralizing the attack. Of course, the benefit
of the attacker if its attack fails is equal to zero.
2) Solving the Game Formulation: The game described
above is discrete and finite. In such an interactive situation, a
natural solution is the Nash equilibrium (NE), which is a stable
state to unilateral deviation. Mathematically this is defined as:
Definition 1. A strategy profile (s∗D, s∗A) is an NE for the
game G if the following conditions are met: uD(s∗D, s∗A) ≥
uD(sD, s
∗
A), ∀sD ∈ SD, uA(s∗D, s∗A) ≥ uA(s∗D, sA), ∀sA ∈
SA.
This means that neither player has any incentive to unilat-
erally deviate and will lose in terms of utility otherwise. This
type of game may not have a pure NE solution but it always
has at least one mixed-strategy NE [22], which is the NE of
the extension of the game G to mixed strategies. It is defined as
follows: G˜ , ({D,A}, {∆D,∆A}, {u˜D, u˜A}). The action sets
of the extended game G˜ are the probability simplices of dimen-
sion Nk, k ∈ {D,A}: ∆k =
{
pk ∈ RNk+
∣∣∣∑Nkj=0 pk,j = 1}
where pk = (pk,0, . . . , pk,Nk−1) is the discrete probability
vector of player k such that pD,j and pA,j represent the
probability of choosing the action dj by the defender and
the probability of choosing the action aj by the attacker,
respectively. The modified payoffs are simply the resulting
expected payoffs following the randomization of play:
u˜k(pD, pA) =
ND−1∑
j=0
NA−1∑
i=0
uk(dj , ai) pD,j pA,i. (4)
The mixed NE can be defined similarly to the pure strategy
NE.
Definition 2. A mixed strategy profile (p∗D, p∗A) is a mixed
an NE for the game G if it is a NE for the ex-
tended game G˜ and the following conditions are met:
u˜D(p
∗
D, p
∗
A) ≥ u˜D(pD, p∗A), ∀pD ∈ ∆D, and u˜A(p∗D, p∗A) ≥
u˜A(p
∗
D, pA), ∀pA ∈ ∆A.
The mixed NE can be computed by using the Von-Neumann
indifference principle [22], which basically says that: i) player
k is rendered indifferent (in terms of its expected payoff)
between its pure actions that are played at the NE with strictly
positive probability, by the choice of the other’s mixed action
p−k, for any k ∈ {D,A}; and ii) the actions that are not
played at the NE (their probability equals 0 at the NE) give
strictly lower payoffs than the ones that are played (see i)),
for both players. Formally, this is stated in the following.
Definition 3. A mixed strategy profile (p∗D, p∗A) is a mixed NE
for the game G if it is an NE for the extended game G˜ and
the following conditions are met:
1) both players are indifferent among their own pure ac-
tions that are played with positive probability at the NE
u˜D(dj , p
∗
A) = u˜D(di, p
∗
A), ∀dj , di ∈ I∗D,
u˜A(p
∗
D, aj) = u˜A(p
∗
D, ai), ∀aj , ai ∈ I∗A.
2) the pure actions that result in strictly smaller payoffs
are played with zero probability at the NE
u˜D(dj , p
∗
A) < u˜D(di, p
∗
A), ∀dj /∈ I∗D, di ∈ I∗D,
u˜A(p
∗
D, aj) < u˜A(p
∗
D, ai), ∀aj /∈ I∗A, ai ∈ I∗A
where the sets I∗k ⊆ Sk,∀k denote the actions that are played
with strictly positive probability at the NE: I∗D = {dj ∈ SD :
p∗D,j > 0} and I∗A = {aj ∈ SA : p∗A,j > 0}.
All defender’s actions that are not in the set dj /∈ I∗D have
zero probability at the NE p∗D,j = 0 (they are not played at
all at the NE) and the same goes for the attaker, all actions
aj /∈ I∗A have zero probability p∗A,j = 0 at the NE. Definition 3
provides a simple way to compute the mixed NEs by solving
a system of linear equations and checking some conditions,
which we adopt in this work.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we perform simulations to show the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed defense. All the simulations are
carried out using the MATPOWER simulator.
First, we examine the D-FACTS deployment set problem.
We perform simulations using the IEEE-14 bus system. As
proposed in Section V-A, we solve the minimum weight
feedback edge set problem for the graph corresponding to the
IEEE-14 bus system. Following this approach, the D-FACTS
deployment set is given by LD = {1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 18, 19}. We
then perturb the reactances of all the links in the set LD.
We simulate physical attacks against the three most important
links in the system, i.e., Links 1, 2 and 3 (which have the
maximum power flow among all the links in the bus system)
by disconnecting the links (one at a time), and injecting a
corresponding CCPA of the form a = ∆Hθp, where both
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Fig. 2: Attack detection probability as a function of the
percentage change (η) in the link reactance.
Bus system |L| |LD|
IEEE 9-bus system 9 1
IEEE 14-bus system 20 7
IEEE 24-bus system 38 15
IEEE 39-bus system 36 8
TABLE I: Size of the D-FACTS deployment set |LD| for
different IEEE bus systems.
∆H and θp are computed using outdated knowledge of the
system. We plot the BDD’s attack detection probability for
each case in Fig. 2 as a function of the percentage change
in line reactances. It can be observed that the CCPAs can be
detected with a high probability following the MTD approach.
Moreover, about 5 − 6% perturbation in the line reactances
is sufficient to achieve a high detection rate. We also enlist
the size of the D-FACTS deployment set for different IEEE
bus systems in Table I. It can be observed that the proposed
algorithm enables the defender to protect all the links in the
system with only a few D-FACTS devices. Moreover, this is
also the minimum-sized D-FACTS deployment set that can
detect any CCPA against the grid. From the table, we can also
conclude that |LD| depends on not just the size of the bus
system, but also its actual topology (e.g., |LD| = 15 for the
24 bus system, where as |LD| = 9 for the 39-bus system).
Finally, we show the effectiveness of the game-
theoretic approach in reducing the operator’s defense
cost. The simulations are done on a IEEE-14 bus
system. The generation cost is assumed to be linear,
i.e., Ci(Gi,t) = ciGi,t. The generators’ capacities at
buses 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 are Gmax = 300, 50, 30, 50, 20 MWs and
ci = 20, 30, 40, 50, 35 $/MWh respectively. fmax is chosen to
be 160 MWs for link 1, and 60 MWs for all other links. We
consider two load conditions: (i) a heavily loaded system,
scenario 1 with the load values at Bus 1 to 14 given by
0, 21.7, 94.2, 47.8, 7.6, 11.2, 0, 0, 29.5, 9, 3.5, 6.1, 13.5, 14.9
MWs respectively, and (ii) a lightly loaded system,
scenario 2 with the load values at Bus 1 to 14 given
by 0, 100, 94.2, 47.8, 30, 11.2, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 MWs
respectively. We consider five MTD perturbation strategies for
the defender, i.e., d1 = {1}, d2 = {1, 3}, d3 = {1, 3, 5}, d4 =
{1, 3, 5, 8}, d5 = {1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 18, 19}. We note that d5 = LD,
which protects all the links of the system from CCPA. The
Load scenario NE D-FACTS
perturbation set
Defense cost
Scenario 1 {1,3,5,8,9,18,19} 11.62 %
Scenario 2 {1,3,5,8} 2.86 %
TABLE II: D-FACTS perturbation set and the defense cost (the
percentage increase in OPF cost) computed using the game-
theoretic approach for different load scenarios.
attacker in turn launches a CCPA by disconnecting one of
the links at a time. Under this set-up, we compute the NE
solution in each of two scenarios according to Definition 3
and the results are listed in Table II. It can be observed
that the D-FACTS perturbation sets in the two scenarios are
different. While, in the heavily loaded scenario (scenario 1),
all the links in LD need to be perturbed, in the lightly loaded
scenario (scenario 2), it is sufficient to perturb only a subset
of links. The rationale is that in the lightly loaded scenario,
only a subset of links need to be protected from physical
attacks, since the attacker is unlikely to target the unimportant
links (i.e., the links that have very little power flow). We
also list the defense cost, which is the percentage increase
in the OPF cost. The NE solution of scenario 2 incurs much
lower defense cost, since only a subset of links are perturbed.
The above experiments show that the MTD perturbation set
depends on the operational state of the system. By following
the proposed game-theoretic approach, the operator can
reduce its defense cost.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have proposed a novel strategy to detect
CCPAs based on MTD and presented MTD design criteria
in this context. We have identified the subset of links for D-
FACTS device deployment that enables the defender to detect
physical attacks against any link in the system. Further, to
reduce the operator’s defense cost, we have identified the set
of links whose reactances must be perturbed at the operational
time based on a game-theoretic approach.
There are still many open problems. First, D-FACTS devices
are traditionally deployed in the grid with an objective of
minimizing the transmission losses [23]. On the other hand, in
this work, we discuss the D-FACTS device deployment prob-
lem from a security point of view only. These considerations
suggest that the D-FACTS deployment problem will generally
involve a trade-off between minimizing the transmission power
losses and the security application. Another important problem
arises in the game-theoretic formulation. Definition 3 provides
a simple way to compute the mixed NEs by solving a system
of linear equations and checking some conditions. Still, in
order to use it, one would have to know in advance the
faces of the simplex ∆D × ∆A on which the NE (p∗D, p∗A)
lies, i.e., one would have to know the sets I∗D and I∗A for
all NEs in advance. An exhaustive search has exponential
complexity: the (ND +NA)-dimesional simplex has 2ND+NA
faces and all possibilities will have to be considered. Thus, a
low-complexity algorithm must be found to compute the NE.
We plan to investigate these issues in our future work.
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